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**COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF THE VIETNAM AND LAOS  
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS**

(This report covers the period from  
26 September through 2 October 1973)

*This memorandum has been prepared jointly by the  
Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense.*

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3 October 1973

DIA review(s)  
completed.

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3 October 1973

Thirty-Second Report

COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF THE VIETNAM AND LAOS  
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS\*

(This report covers the week from  
26 September through 2 October 1973)

The Key Points

- Hanoi maintained the momentum of its dry season infiltration push as more than 1,500 combat troops entered the pipeline last week.
- Significant logistics activity was noted in the northern and southern North Vietnamese Panhandle. Within northern South Vietnam considerable amounts of cargo continued to be moved. The North Vietnamese are still concentrating on road building in southern Laos.
- The Communists may have extended the petroleum pipeline which crosses the DMZ southward to the A Shau Valley.
- Combat activity was generally low in both Laos and South Vietnam.

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The Details

NOTE: This is the thirty-second in a series of memoranda summarizing evidence received during the reporting period of (I) Communist efforts to infiltrate new manpower and military materiel toward and into South Vietnam, (II) Communist-initiated combat activity in violation of the Vietnam and Laos settlement agreements, and (III) other developments affecting Communist military capabilities in Indochina.

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I. Infiltration and Redeployments of North Vietnamese Personnel and Military Supplies

A. Personnel Infiltration and Redeployments

1. Four new battalion-size combat infiltration groups were observed moving southward in the pipeline during the past week. One of these newly detected groups--destined for the central coast of South Vietnam--was included in last week's estimate since the evidence available at that time indicated that it had already started south with other observed groups. The other three new groups are traveling toward southern Laos, increasing our estimate of infiltration starts by more than 1,500 troops.

2. With the addition of the three groups, we now estimate that more than 15,000 North Vietnamese, including over 13,000 combat troops, have started south since the 15 June "second" ceasefire. Of this total, more than half began their journey since 1 September. In the period since the signing of the original ceasefire on 27 January, over 65,000 personnel

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## Communist and South Vietnamese Regular Combat Forces in South Vietnam

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## South Vietnam

## Regular Combat Forces

VC/NVA<sup>1</sup>RVNAF<sup>2</sup>

180,000

320,000

MR 1

VC/NVA	RVNAF
86,000	89,000
325th	VNMC
324B	Airborne
320B	1st
304th	2nd
711th	3rd
2nd	Regional Forces

MR 2


VC/NVA	RVNAF
32,000	68,000
320th	23rd
10th	22nd
3rd	Regional Forces

MR 3

VC/NVA	RVNAF
36,000	75,000
429th Sapper Command	25th
9th	18th
7th	5th
5th	Regional Forces

MR 4

VC/NVA	RVNAF
26,000	88,000
1st	21st
	9th
	7th
	44th Special Tactical Zone
	Regional Forces



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[redacted]

have infiltrated southward. More than 40,000 of these have started since 27 January, while the remaining 25,000 were in the pipeline moving southward as of that date. (ANNEX B, [redacted] contains a more detailed discussion of the information pertaining to infiltration which was received during the past week.)

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B. Movement of Military Equipment and Supplies

North Vietnam


3. Significant logistic activity in the northern North Vietnamese Panhandle was noted for the second week in a row. The heaviest supply activity was observed near Thanh Hoa City where on 21 September some 425 tons of cargo were shipped southward from Thanh Hoa to Vinh. Several days later on 24 September [redacted] a logistics unit in the Thanh Hoa area moved 380 tons of cargo during an unspecified period and had some 140 tons of cargo remaining to be shipped. The following day logistics units in this same area moved over 900 tons of cargo. This activity indicates that despite the affects of the recent typhoons some supplies are continuing to be funneled into the top of the logistics pipeline.

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4. In the area south of Vinh cargo also continues to move despite the floods. Limited data reflected three significant cargo shipments. On 23 September a logistics unit in southern Quang Binh reportedly received over 150 tons of cargo--including 60 tons of munitions--from a unit located near Vinh. Two days later on 25 September, a unit shipped some 300 tons of rice to Long Dai near the Ban Karai Pass and 220 tons the following day.

Laos

5. Logistics activity in the Laotian Panhandle was again light this week. Some preparations for future supply movement continued to be noted, but



no other evidence has been received that would indicate that such activity is imminent. North Vietnamese troops are still concentrating on road building activities. On the resupply side rice and other foodstuffs were the only materiel detected moving in significant quantities in the Panhandle, but most of this appeared to be for local consumption, rather than destined for units in South Vietnam.

#### South Vietnam

6. Limited information suggests that considerable amounts of materiel continue to be moved by transportation units in northern South Vietnam. In northeastern Quang Tri Province [ ] on 27 September a logistics unit received 265 trucks and dispatched 260 at Cam Lo near Dong Ha. To the west a large convoy of some 40 trucks was reported near Route 9 on 29 September. Similar activity is expected to continue in the near future with roads in the DMZ carrying heavy south-bound traffic.

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## II. Communist-Initiated Combat Activity in South Vietnam and Laos

### A. South Vietnam

7. In South Vietnam, the total number of communist-initiated ceasefire violations reported by the South Vietnamese Armed Forces since 27 January, 15 June, and for the last week (26 Sep - 2 Oct) are shown below:

<u>Military Region</u>	<u>Total Since 27 January Ceasefire</u>		<u>Total Since 15 June Ceasefire</u>		<u>Last Week (26 Sep-2 Oct)</u>	
	Major	Minor	Major	Minor	Major	Minor
MR 1	1,316	4,603	291	1,244	36	101
MR 2	522	3,535	258	1,681	19	113
MR 3	549	3,896	147	1,320	11	54
MR 4	1,053	9,454	375	3,288	32	206
Totals	3,440	21,488	1,071	7,533	98 (84)	474 (467) <u>1/</u>

1/ Denotes totals of previous week.



8. Some of these violations may have been initiated by GVN forces rather than communist forces, and it is impossible in all cases to determine the actual instigator. The table above and the charts on the following pages, however, do show fairly accurately the trend in the amount of combat that has occurred in South Vietnam since the ceasefire. The fact that a combat incident occurred at a particular time and place is generally reported accurately by the South Vietnamese, even though the question of who started it may not always be treated in objective fashion.

B. Laos

9. Military activity continued in Laos at a low level during the past week. Minor enemy shellings and attacks occurred in Military Regions II and III of north and central Laos, resulting in negligible government casualties.

III. Other Developments Affecting Communist Capabilities in Indochina

A. More Pipeline Construction in South Vietnam

10. Aerial photography [ ] shows that the Communists' petroleum pipeline which crosses the DMZ may have been extended into the A Shau Valley [ ] About 14 miles of new pipeline were observed along the 29 mile distance between the former terminus at Ba Long and the large, newly built petroleum storage facility at A Luoi in northern A Shau Valley. Dense tree cover prevented sighting of pipeline traces along the entire route; however, the presence of two probable pumping stations and the link up with the A Luoi storage area suggest that the new line may already be completed. Prior to September, NVA forces in the A Shau were reported to have been supplied with POL from a branch pipeline extending eastward from the earlier-built Laotian Panhandle pipeline system (see map). Extension of the pipeline from Ba Long into the A Shau would be a more efficient means of providing fuel to support logistic activity along the new western supply corridor.

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
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# CEASE-FIRE VIOLATIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM AS REPORTED BY RVNAF


(28 JANUARY THROUGH 31 JULY 1973)





# CEASE-FIRE VIOLATIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM AS REPORTED BY RVNAF

(1 AUGUST 1973 TO THE PRESENT)



B. Communist Road Repairs in Eastern Cambodia

11. A North Vietnamese rallier recently reported that bomb damage along Route 7 was being repaired. This was substantiated by photographs [redacted] which showed a corduroy road constructed around one interdiction and bridges in various stages of completion being built at several others. The improvements could facilitate shipments of supplies to Communist elements in Cambodia and South Vietnam during the coming dry season.

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## ANNEX B

Post-Ceasefire Infiltration of North Vietnamese  
Personnel to the South

1. Four regular combat infiltration groups were initially detected moving southward during the past week. Three of these groups--5077, 5078, and 5079, all of which apparently are traveling to southern Laos/MR 559--were detected entering the pipeline at Vinh between 29 September and 1 October. The combined strength of these groups is more than 1,500 troops. Groups 5075 and 5076, tentatively included in our estimate last week, have now been confirmed.

2. Our accounting continues to leave a gap of ten undetected groups (5065-5074) in the 5xxx series. However, a reference to "5067" occurred in a 26 September message between two unidentified elements of Rear Services Group 473, which operates primarily in the northern portion of South Vietnam's MR 1. While this may have been a reference to regular combat Group 5067, textual ambiguities in the intercept make it impossible to be certain that it has actually entered the infiltration pipeline. The lack of any conclusive evidence concerning Groups 5065-5074 suggests that at least some of them have not yet been inserted into the pipeline. Such delays, which have occurred in the past, could have resulted from a need for additional manpower to repair flood damage in North Vietnam caused by the recent typhoons.

3. In any event, the detection of Groups 5077 through 5079 this week underlines Hanoi's clear intent to dispatch Groups 5065 through 5074 southward, if they have not already done so. The ultimate acceptance of these groups will increase our estimate of starts to southern Laos/MR 559 by some 5,000 troops. Table 1, below, shows infiltration starts, including specialists, from North Vietnam since 1 January 1973. Table 2 compares the infiltration of combat troops, by destination, since 1 September 1973 with the comparable period a year ago.

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Table 1

Number of Personnel Entering the Pipeline  
Destined for South Vietnam, Southern  
Laos, and Cambodia Since 1 January 1973

	<u>Total</u>	<u>Special-Purpose</u>
January	20,000	1,600
February	10,200	2,100
March	3,250	2,250
April	1,925	1,200
May	7,175	300
June	2,200	700
July	3,650	600
August	2,200	700
September	7,050	50
October 1-2	1,000	0



Table 2

Comparative Infiltration Starts of Combat  
Troops from North Vietnam, By Destination  
1 September through 2 October\*

	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>
Total	<u>4,000</u>	<u>8,000</u>
MR Tri-Thien-Hue	2,500	2,000
MR-5	1,500	2,000
B-3 Front	0	0
COSVN	0	0
Southern Laos/MR 559	0	4,000

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\* This table covers the infiltration of North Vietnamese troops to South Vietnam, Cambodia, and southern Laos. Infiltrators moving to northern Laos are not included.

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